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awrence Kohlberg's theory of moral
development has been enormously
influential in psychology. As Dr. Julie
Dunlap states, his work has been
concerned exclusively with the
development of our moral attitudes
toward other humans. Her research is a welcome
attempt to use Kohlberg's theory to probe for
the development of moral concern about nonhuman animals and nature in general.
We should be aware, however, as Dr. Dunlap is,
that some serious doubts about Kohlberg's
theory have been raised by psychologists and
philosophers. Kohlberg holds that there is a
fixed, invariant sequence of stages through
which humans progress as their moral thinking
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becomes increasingly adequate. These stages are
subdivisions of three levels: (I) preconventional
or egocentric (Stages 1 and 2), (II) conventional
(Stages 3 and 4), and (III) post-conventional
(Stages 5 and 6).1 There is ample evidence for
the existence of these three levels. We can see
them in our own histories and in many around
us. There are those who require threats of punishment or promises of rewards to abide by
moral rules; those who accept such rules without
question, happy to follow authority and majority
opinion; and those who are capable of
autonomous thinking about morality. In this
respect, our intuitions seem to match carefully
gathered psychological data. Nevertheless, a
number of problems have surfaced. Even
Kohlberg's own research began to reveal serious
flaws in his scheme. To mention just one serious
problem, male subjects who were scored at Stage
5 or 4 in high school went off to college and,
contrary to the theory, apparently regressed to
egocentric relativism (Stage 2).2 Even more troubling to many was the fact that female subjects
tested by the Kohlberg dilemmas tended to be
rated as less morally developed than many of
their male counterparts. As Dr. Dunlap notes,
Carol Gilligan has argued extensively that these
results reveal the Kohlberg theory to be biased
against females and excessively narrow in its
exclusive focus on justice concerns in moral
thinking. 3
In(response to his problematical data,
Kohlberg considered but eventually rejected
allowing for moral regression in his theory. He
decided instead to revise his scoring manual.
Boys formerly classified as having reached the
post-conventional level were retroactively classified as conventional. Their "Stage 2" egocentrism was construed as a transitional phase
between Stages 4 and 5. 4 Moreover, in response
to Carol Gilligan's criticisms, Kohlberg changed
his classification of male "law and order," Archie
Bunker-type responses from Stage 4 to Stage 3,
thus further lowering overall male scores. As a
result of the scoring manual revisions, the evidence of significant regression disappeared, as
well as the comparatively poor showing of
women. s Kohlberg now believes that Stage 5 will
only be attained by a minority of adult humans. 6
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All his former Stage 6 scores disappeared with
the revision, leaving Kohlberg to speculate that
only a very few extraordinary individuals (e.g.,
Socrates, Christ, Gandhi, and King) are fully
autonomous moral thinkers. 7
However, the fact remains that Kohlberg's formerly high-scoring high school boys, reclassified
as conventional, did appear to give autonomous,
principled responses to the dilemmas. Kohlberg
resolved this discrepancy by making two new theoretical postulations: a conventional substage A
and a substage B which he characterizes as "the
autonomous substage of conventional thinking."8
Thus, the boys' responses are now scored as
being both conventional and autonomous, and
the anomalies in the data have magically disappeared. 9
One cannot help feeling uneasy about this way
of dealing with a theoretical crisis. Consider
Kohlberg's own description of his decision to
recategorize his data:
Because it was unsatisfactory to include
regression or retrogression in a moral stage
scheme, we were led to (a) revise definitions
of Stage 5 (and 6) and (b) to make a distinction between a more morally
autonomous B substage and a less
autonomous A substage at the conventional
level. 10
The ad hoc air of this maneuver is hardly dispelled by Kohlberg's name for it: "our circular
boot-strapping approach."l1
However, even if one has serious reservations
about Kohlberg's classification scheme, it can still
be used to show whether adolescents who are
engaged in moral reasoning think about animals
or the environment in general in the same way in
which they think about humans. If we use the
scheme, eyes wide open to its limitations, we
should be able to find out something.
It's interesting that Kohlberg himself asks
questions about animals in his follow-up interviews for the "Heinz" and "Doctor" dilemmas.
The following optional questions appears in the
Heinz interview: "Suppose it is a pet animal he
loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet
animal?"12 In the Doctor interview the animalrelated question is not optional: "When a pet
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animal is badly wounded and will die, it is killed
to put it out of its pain. Does the same thing
apply here?"13 One has a strong suspicion that
Kohlberg's intent here is to classify answers that
distinguish between animal and human cases as
higher-level than those which do not. Elsewhere
Kohlberg gives us the following example of
Stage 1 moral thinking: "At the age of four my
son joined the pacifist and vegetarian
movement and refused to eat meat because, he
said, it is bad to kill animals."14 According to
Kohlberg, he and his wife were forced to pose
and try to answer this question: "Why is it all
right to' kill and eat animals but not humans?"
For six months all their arguments about 'Justified" as opposed to "unjustified" killing fell on
unresponsive Stage 1 ears. I5
By contrast, Dr. Dunlap's research exhibits
no such preconceptions. She has constructed
dilemmas and follow-up questions which allow
her to compare adolescents' responses to parallel human and animal moral quandaries in a
systematic way. Her data do indeed indicate
that boys are capable of showing moral concern
about animals and the environment in general,
contrary to Nash's speculation that such
concern could only arise after Stage 6 has been
achieved (making any such individuals scarcer
than hen's teeth on Kohlberg's current scoring
system). While this is encouraging news to
those of us who share these concerns, however,
there are grounds for caution in our interpretation of the data.
First, although Dr. Dunlap repeatedly states
that the boys she tested used the same "moral
logic" to address the animal and human
dilemmas, the moral stage scores for the animal
dilemmas are consistently lower than stage
scores for the parallel human cases.
Although the overlap indicates that some
boys did reason at the same stage for humans
and animals, a good many apparently did not.
(We all know such people. An extremely intelligent, caring physician recently told me quite
seriously that it was ridiculous to try to "save
the whales." He explained that they were no
longer "good for anything" since we have
stopped needing oil lamps and corsets.)
Second, even if the boy does reason at the
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same stage for animals as for humans, this does
not necessarily mean that he regards them as
being on a moral par. For example, Kohlberg
reports the following response from a ten-yearold boy to one of his animal related questions
(i.e., should the doctor put the woman out of
her misery as one would a badly wounded pet?):
But the husband wouldn't want it, it's not
like an animal. If a pet dies you can get
along without it - it isn't something you
really need. Well, you can get a new wife,
but it's not really the same. 16
The boy is consistently reasoning at Stage 2
here in seeing pet and wife in terms of their
instrumental value to the husband, but the
animal is clearly downgraded in comparison to
the wife.
Nevertheless, Dr. Dunlap's data clearly do
demonstrate genuine concern for animals
among some boys at Stages 3 and 4. She was
also able to elicit some more general pro-environment sentiments. However, despite the title
of her paper, the dilemmas she has devised are
really more suitable as tests of adolescents' attitudes toward individual animals than their attitudes toward the environment as such. All six
of her animal dilemmas are concerned with
individual animals, and four of the six concern
domestic animals. Environmental ethics, when
it is concerned with animals at all, focuses on
wild animals; undoubtedly, this is the reason for
Dr. Dunlap's wild chimpanzee dilemmas. But
environmental ethics encompasses much more
as well: concern for nonsentient living beings,
for ecological systems, even for (according to
some environmental ethicists) the nonliving
parts of nature. Perhaps some additional
dilemmas could be constructed to test for these
concerns. For example, "Should Heinz sabotage logging equipment in order to save a
redwood?" "Should Senator Gallo fight or
support her constituents' desire to turn a
wilderness area into a shopping mall?"
Although the Kohlberg scheme was designed to
test for moral reasoning about sentient individuals, perhaps it could be extended in such a
way to encompass more environmental ethical
concerns.
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Many of Dr. Dunlap's subjects did express one
concern which environmental ethicists share the
desire for preserving members of rare species. I
fear, however, that much of that concern arose
from the belief that rare animals, unlike
"common" animals, are simply less replaceable.
This con tempt for "common," allegedly
"replaceable" animals can generate concern for
endangered species, but it has very unfavorable
implications for many individual animals. Those
who believe that individual sentient animals are
morally considerable cannot take heart in such
an attitude, although many environmental ethicists can.
The good news in all this for those who are concerned about nonhumans is that many adolescents
can and do show empathetic, caring responses for
those who don't belong to their own species. Some
- those who are able to criticize human society
and who suggest that we have behaved irresponsibly toward animals and the environment in
general - are even capable of autonomous
thinking. This is especially encouraging, since
those who are capable of questioning societal
norms and behavior are capable of perceiving and
rejecting prejudices such as homocentrism and
speciesism. Whether we classify these young
people's responses as Stage 5 or 6, or as "substage
B," is really not all that important. At least, as Dr.
Dunlap has shown, concern for nonhumans is not
restricted to a tiny, possibly mythical elite of sages
even more advanced than Socrates.
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He is content to wait a long time.
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His name...unassuming-from a
damaged finger; a shy and gentle being
who died with great courage, alone,
amid savagery, fighting for his family;
and for him, the woman on the
mountain grieved and caused a
thoughtless world to take note and mark
his passing.
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16Lawrence Kohlberg, "From 'Is' to 'Ought':
How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get
Away with It in the Study of Moral Development,"
The Philosophy of Moral Development, op. cit., p. 118.

She too died, in a way, alone, fighting
for her family, amid savagery.
The Cree say that when a human being
dies, the soul must stand within a circle
of animals--all those one has abused, or
killed without need and without
respect-in the misty land of the dead,
and woe be unto that soul!

The following prose-poem is written in
memory of Paulette Nenner. Paulette
was an artist and an animal rights
activist. Though neither of us had ever
met Dian Fossey, we shared a longstanding admiration for the woman and
her work that began for both of us when
we first saw those early National
Geographic films of Dian interacting
with free gorillas, especially with her
beloved Digit. Paulette said that
someday she wanted to go to Rwanda
and help patrol the mountains for
poachers. She never made it. She died

It is also said by those who have died
and come back that there is, after death,
a moving toward a great light, and that
along the way one encounters helpers
who comfort and encourage us on this
journey.

The woman on the mountain...when her
turn came...there would have been no
circle of animal judges to try her.

of pneumonia in March, 1988 in New
York City. But I like to think she did at
last get to meet her heroine, the woman
on the mountain.
- Paulette Callen

She moves toward the light.
And out of the mists there steps one
to meet her.
The one she called Digit.

Nutley, New Jersey
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